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1 Introduction
Jorgensenn and Hanssen (2018) argue that the gross research output of individ-
ual academics, measured by the number of published pages, would serve as an
acceptable basis for an incentive to increase academic research. An instinctive
concern is that it would compromise research quality (not to mention teaching
and academic citizenship activities). The authors’ answer to this concern is
that their formal model of academic behavior shows that, in fact, quality and
quantity would increase proportionally in response to such an incentive. Since
quantity is easier to observe and measure objectively, it follows that it is a
preferable measure for performance and therefore incentivisation (Jorgensenn
and Hanssen, 2018: 1045-1046).
There are various reasons why this striking result, and the associated policy
proposals, warrants some interrogation. The first key premise of the analysis
is that more academic output is inherently good. The second is that, given
the desirability of increasing output, using extrinsic incentives is appropriate
in the domain of higher education. Both these premises are subject to signif-
icant contention. The claim that gross research output is an inherent good
(Jorgensenn and Hanssen, 2018: 1030) contrasts with concerns (Altbach and
de Wit, 2018) that a significant proportion of rapidly-rising global academic
research is of little or no value in itself, meaning in turn that the resources
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devoted to it are wasted and the volume itself has negative externalities.1
Furthermore, in various countries and disciplines research incentives appear
to have been associated with increases (in number or proportion) of lower
quality and predatory publications. Such concerns in one middle-income de-
veloping country that utilises sizeable publication incentives (South Africa)
have been noted and substantiated in a number of analyses (Vaughan, 2008;
Thomas and De Bruin, 2015; Muller, 2017; de Jager, de Kock, and Van der
Spuy, 2017; Mouton and Valentine, 2017; Tomaselli, 2018).2 Beyond these
consequence-oriented concerns, one may make the more profound objection
that pecuniary incentives are inherently inconsistent with many conceptuali-
sations of the university itself (Barnett, 2013).3
These issues provide some motivation for the detailed analysis of Jorgensenn
and Hanssen (2018)’s counter-intuitive result that follows, but are set aside
for the sake of engaging with the authors’ formal analysis on its own terms.
The first section, and focus of, the analysis addresses the claim that a for-
mal model of academic behaviour implies that an salary incentive based on
research output will not undermine output quality. I argue that this claim
follows from two subtle modelling failures: an inadequate representation of an
individual researcher’s chosen (equilibrium) level of research quality, and an
incorrect formulation of the policy problem. When these are corrected, the
model produces an outcome that coheres with the intuition that an output-
based incentive would undermine quality.
The second section raises four other modelling concerns: problematic assump-
tions; the conflation of assumptions and findings; (im)plausibility of some find-
ings; and, the neglected importance of heterogeneity and temporal dynamics
in the population of academics.
The final section briefly addresses a broader question, namely the limitations
and dangers of utilising economic modelling to inform higher education policy
in the manner Jorgensenn and Hanssen (2018) intend.
2 A refutation: a quantity incentive does reduce quality
As is customary in economic modelling, Jorgensenn and Hanssen (2018) (hence-
forth ‘JH’) begin with a discussion of a general model of academic behaviour
1 These resources can be thought of in much broader terms than merely pecuniary ones.
For instance, one could consider the opportunity cost of skilled individuals spending time on
research that has neither intellectual nor practical value when they could be making other
contributions to society.
2 The authors acknowledge in passing that low quality publications are ‘inevitable’ (Jor-
gensenn and Hanssen, 2018: 1031) but do not elaborate on the reasons for that.
3 The authors note, for instance, the tension between academic freedom and the manipu-
lative intent behind pecuniary incentives (Jorgensenn and Hanssen, 2018: 1031) but proceed
on the basis that “[New Public Management] has been the guiding governance model of
university reforms in Europe for the last 20 years”.
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and then specify a functional form for the relevant dimensions in order to de-
rive more detailed results. For the sake of brevity, the analysis that follows
only repeats equations from their model where it is necessary to do so – the
reader is referred to the original paper for more detail. For ease of reference
these are denoted with their equation numbers in square parentheses, whereas
the equations in our analysis are in ordinary parentheses.
2.1 Outline of concerns
There are three key equations specified by JH: a utility function for the hy-
pothetical academic; a salary function; and, a research production function
(Jorgensenn and Hanssen, 2018: 1039).4
U = U(β1S + β2lnL+ β3P + β4Q) [14]
S = τ0 + τ1P + τ2Q+ τ3E [15]
Q = α0t
α1Tα2Iα3 [16]
Academics are assumed to be driven by some combination of salary (‘S’),
research quality (‘Q’), research quantity (in pages, ‘P’) and leisure time. Over
some base level, salary is assumed to be determined by an additive combination
of research volume, research quality and external activities (‘E’). Finally, the
quality of research is determined by an interactive combination of time spent
reading relevant literature (‘T’), time spent per page written (‘t’) and the
academic’s level of qualification or ability (‘I’).
JH follow standard modelling practice and derive optimal levels of relevant
variables based on the assumption that our academic will maximise their util-
ity function, through their choice of T , t, P and E. The key result for the
conclusion and policy recommendation discussed above is:
Q∗ =
β3 + β1τ1
α1(β4 + β1τ2)
· P ∗ [23]
JH rest their conclusion on the fact that equilibrium quality (Q∗) can be
written as a positive function of equilibrium quantity (P ∗). There are two
immediate analytical concerns here.
First, as a matter of good practice: Q∗ should be written in full as a function
of only parameters and coefficients, then the effect of an output incentive on
quality should be derived by taking the partial derivative of Q∗ with respect
to the parameter that captures the weight on quantity (τ1).
5 This is no mere
quibble, as will become apparent below.
4 These are equations [14], [15] and [16] in the original paper.
5 JH only provide, in the same equation, a reduced form version of Q∗ as a function of
parameters and coefficients and do not derive the relevant partial derivative.
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Second, and relatedly, JH do not discuss other characteristics of [23] that are
counter-intuitive. Notably, the form presented appears to suggest that Q∗ is
lower when there is greater weight on quality in the salary function (τ2), but
higher when there is greater weight on quantity. Even if one were to believe
that a quantity incentive had a positive effect on quality, it seems surprising
that a quality incentive is associated with lower equilibrium quality. On the
face of it, then, [23] requires more explanation than is provided.
2.2 The actual effect of a quantity incentive
The representation of the relationship between quality and quantity in JH’s
model is subject to little justification or explanation, but even if we accept
their formulation the framing of the policy question is flawed. Specifically, JH
effectively envisage a quantity-based incentive as only increasing τ1 but that
does not reflect two critical real-world factors: policymakers have resource
constraints and devoting resources to a quantity incentive necessarily means
fewer resources for a quality incentive. Thus, for the model to represent the
policy problem we require an additional equation that relates the weight of
quantity (τ1) and quality (τ2).
To address our first concern, we write optimal quality solely in terms of model
parameters and coefficients yields, with some simplification:6
Q∗ =
(
β3 + β1τ1
β1τ3
)α1+α2
1−α2 · (β4 + β1τ2)
α2
1−α2 · α
α2
1−α2
2 · α
α2
1−α2
0 · I
α3
1−α2 (1)
2.3 Recovering intuition
As noted above, for the policy problem to be realistic there ought to be a
tradeoff between the weights placed on quality and quantity in the salary
function shown in equation [15].7 Although that issue is mentioned in the
discussion (Jorgensenn and Hanssen, 2018: 1033-1034), it is not reflected in
the specification chosen for the original salary function. For the sake of simple
exposition, we utilise a simple linear representation:
τ2 = 1− τ1 (2)
In doing this we effectively supplement the authors’ assumption that τ1, τ2, τ3 >
0 with an assumption that τ1+τ2 ≤ w – where we choose w = 1 for simplicity.8
6 This utilises equations [17] and [23] in the original paper; one could alternatively use
[16], [18] and [19].
7 In addition, even within the model without a tradeoff: for the policy analysis to be
sufficiently thorough one should compare the effect of increasing the weight on quantity (τ1)
and increasing the weight on quality (τ2).
8 There should be no loss of generality provided the other model parameters are in-
terpreted accordingly. An alternative, more complicated, approach would be to develop a
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Substituting (2) into (1) yields:
Q∗ =
(
β3 + β1τ1
β1τ3
)α1+α2
1−α2 · (β4 + β1 − β1τ1)
α2
1−α2 · α
α2
1−α2
2 · α
α2
1−α2
0 · I
α3
1−α2 (3)
The policy question raised by the authors is: what is the effect of an output-
based salary incentive on an individual researcher’s chosen (‘optimal’/utility-
maximising) quality? In the model this is equivalent to asking: what is the
partial derivative of Q∗ with respect to τ1? The result based on (3) is shown
in (4).
∂Q∗
∂τ1
= β1
α1 + α2
1− α2
(
β3 + β1τ1
β1τ3
)α1+2α2−1
1−α2 · (β4 + β1 − β1τ1)
α2
1−α2 · (α0α2)
α2
1−α2 · I
α3
1−α2
−
(
β3 + β1τ1
β1τ3
)α1+α2
1−α2 · β1 α2
1− α2 (β4 + β1 − β1τ1)
2α2−1
1−α2 · (α0α2)
α2
1−α2 · I
α3
1−α2
(4)
In order for an increase in the weight on publication quantity to have a positive
effect on equilibrium quality we must have: ∂Q
∗
∂τ1
> 0. Simplifying and solving
(4) requires ascertaining the sign of the following expression:
(β4 + β1 − β1τ1)
It is easy to see that this expression is positive if τ1 <
β4+β1
β1
. The right-
hand side is greater than one, which means that the condition is satisfied given
the constraint we have placed on τ1 and τ2.
The resultant expression following from (4) is:
τ1 <
β4τ3
α1+α2
α2
+ β1τ3
α1+α2
2 − β3
1− β1τ3 α1+α2α2
(5)
The expression is not sufficiently informative in this form but to focus on
the question of interest, we make τ3 equal to zero (i.e. the individual academic
does not have remunerative external opportunities).9 In that case, we have the
following result:
∂Q∗
∂τ1
> 0⇒ τ1 < −β3 (6)
Given that β3 and τ1 must both be positive, it follows that the expression
cannot be satisfied. In other words, an increase in the relative weight placed on
constrained maximisation problem for the policy-maker with an appropriately formulated
budget constraint.
9 There is no reason – based on the structure of the model, or reality – to believe that
eliminating external opportunities will affect the basic result of interest.
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quantity does not increase equilibrium quality. Thus, accounting for the poli-
cymaker’s trade-off yields the opposite result to that advanced in Jorgensenn
and Hanssen (2018).
It seems likely that the failure to introduce an appropriate resource trade-
off would also explain another of JH’s counter-intuitive findings, namely that
changes in fixed salary (τ0) do not affect quantity or quality of research.
10
3 Additional modelling concerns: assumptions, findings and
plausibility
In addition to the specific claim addressed above, there are a number of other
aspects of JH’s analysis that merit comment. First, some of the assumptions
in their model are problematic in what they imply about individual academic
motives and the public good. Second, parts of the analysis conflate ‘findings’
and ‘assumptions’. Third, the plausibility of certain findings/derivations is not
established. Finally, while the paper discusses the possibility of heterogeneity
among academic, it fails to adequately address the static and dynamic impli-
cations of this. I provide a brief sketch of each of these concerns below.
3.1 Problematic assumptions
Among the questionable modelling assumptions that are likely to have a ma-
terial impact on the main findings are:11
 The utility function assumes that academics receive no utility from teaching
or academic citizenship activities, only research, leisure time, salary and
external activities that generate additional remuneration
 An individual academic’s subjective perception of quality is assumed to
coincide with the policymaker or manager’s perception, which in turn is
assumed to coincide with (unobserved) actual quality.
The overprioritisation of research outputs relative to teaching is a perennial
concern raised within debates about policies within universities and higher
education systems. A model that assumes no utility from teaching, and no
link between time devoted to teaching and teaching quality, is problematic if
it is then used to inform related policies. While it is entirely plausible that an
academic may substitute time away from teaching in response to a research
output incentive – thereby reducing teaching quality – there is no way to
capture such negative effects in the model.
10 This is particularly contrary to the intuition of the model itself. The finding that fixed
salary does not affect optimal leisure time also contradicts the standard intuition of labour
supply models.
11 An example of a dubious assumption that is unlikely to affect the main results is the
assumption that academic qualifications do not enter into the salary function (only the
quality function).
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The assumption of a correct, shared quality function is also problematic.12 In
developing higher education systems in particular, any of the relevant agents
– university managers, policymakers and individual academics – may not have
informed/accurate notions of what constitutes quality research. All else equal,
if those providing the incentive cannot distinguish low quality work from high
quality work (Q in the salary function is observed imperfectly) then academics
will maximise utility by producing lower quality work, limited only by their
instrinsic attachment to their own perceptions of quality (β4).
3.2 Assumptions are not findings
It is profoundly important to distinguish modelling assumptions from findings,
but in a number of places JH conflate these. For example, they state that:
“our model results imply that every researcher’s utility increases with salary
and the potential for external income and decreases with teaching duties”
(Jorgensenn and Hanssen, 2018: 1044). However, as noted above: the model
assumes academics get no utility from teaching by omitting this from the
utility function. The same is true for external income, which provides utility
via the salary function.
Another example, linking to our analysis in 2, is the claim that JH ‘find’ that
“changing the basic salary will not influence the researcher’s behaviour and,
thereby, the quantity (P ∗) and quality of his research (Q∗)” (Jorgensenn and
Hanssen, 2018: 1045). Aside from the oddity of such a result in comparison
to typical economic models of this kind, where higher fixed income would
increase optimal leisure time, the finding is likely to be the direct consequence
of assuming that there is no trade-off between the basic component of the
salary (τ0) and the output-related components (τ1 and τ2).
3.3 Plausibility of findings
A number of JH’s findings are counter-intuitive, either in relation to standard
economic models of labour supply or in relation to the academic context to
which their model applies. In and of themselves, counter-intuitive findings are
not problematic – indeed, some economists hold the view that only counter-
intuitive modelling results are of interest – but they require additional expla-
nation. Specifically, it is necessary to explain what mechanisms in the model
produce those results. Without such explanation, such findings may point to
flaws in the model or modelling assumptions.
12 JH state that: “we have made the tacit assumption that the researcher’s perception of the
quality of his research...coincides with the employer’s perception in the salary function...This
is an important and reasonable assumption” (Jorgensenn and Hanssen, 2018: 1035).
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In section 2 we have of course already dealt with the most striking of the im-
plausible findings. Among the other findings that appear puzzling sans further
explanation are:
 Optimal leisure time is unaffected by the fixed component of the salary,
the quality and output incentives, the utility gained from research, or the
parameters of the quality production function
 Time spent per page of research (t∗) increases with the weight on pages of
output in the utility and salary function13 (Jorgensenn and Hanssen, 2018:
1041-1042)
 Teaching and related time (D) can be increased without affecting quantity
or quality of research.
In textbook models of labour supply, an increase in fixed salary beyond a
certain point increases optimal leisure time. At the margin, one would simi-
larly expect greater absolute incentives for quality and quantity of research to
decrease leisure time. And that time spent per page would be lower/decrease
with the utility and salary weights on output, since the researcher would care
less about quality and more about pages produced.14 Finally, the finding that
increasing teaching load only affects (remunerated) external activities cannot
hold where such activities are non-existent; the nature of time constraints
means that in such situations it must affect research or leisure time.
In the absence of a detailed elaboration of the underlying mechanisms that
produce such counter-intuitive results, it is difficult to attribute much signifi-
cance to them.
3.4 Heterogeneity and temporal dynamics of the population of academics
In a number of places, JH allude to the possible implications of variation
among academics and even across institutions. However, this is generally in
relation to factors outside the model, whereas there are various characteristics
of the model itself that necessitate such analysis – especially if it is intended
to inform policy.
The omission of teaching from the utility function is one example of how the
model imposes a homogeneity assumption on the population of academics.
Furthermore, the model implicitly assumes identical values to all the param-
eters and coefficients within the population of academics. For policy purposes
this is inadequate.
13 The result in [18] of the original paper also implies that if an academic receives no utility
from research quantity and there is no quantity incentive, then they will spend zero time
per page in equilibrium, which makes no sense.
14 The explanation JH provide argues that this is a function of a maximising trade-off
within the salary function, but that explains why an academic would increase the number
of pages written – not time per page.
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Consider again JH’s main proposal pertaining to a research output incentive.
Where there is variation in academics’ intrinsic motivation to produce quality
research (β4) relative to the utility they get from income (β1), under a stan-
dard optimisation framework academics with the least intrinsic motivation will
react the most to an incentive. Furthermore, academics with lower ability and
lower intrinsic motivation will produce more pages in equilibrium than aca-
demics with higher ability and greater intrinsic motivation. Where there is a
trade-off in the allocation of public resources, as I have suggested must be the
case, this means that an increasing proportion of resources will be allocated
to those who produce for the sake of page numbers rather than substantive
intellectual contribution. And that the total output of academic research will
increase primarily through the higher contributions of extrinsically motivated
academics.
As JH note, their model does not capture dynamics across institutions and
over time (Jorgensenn and Hanssen, 2018: 1043-1047). The consequences of
intra-population heterogeneity described above could also lead to selection
into and out of the academic population over time. At the margin, ‘outside
options’ for academics who are more intrinsically motivated will become .15
4 Economic modelling and higher education policy
One common response to concerns about realism of assumptions and limita-
tions of formal models is to say that ‘models are necessarily simplifications of
the real world otherwise they would not be useful’. The analogy of maps is
often used: a map would not be useful if it was made on a 1:1 scale.16 How-
ever, the problem this raises is: what level of ‘realism’ is sufficient to produce
findings that are plausibly accurate? Given the profound epistemological, onto-
logical and even metaphysical, questions this raises, it is hardly surprising that
this remains the subject of active philosophical and methodological debate in a
number of disciplines. In the current context, its narrower instantiation is: how
informative is economic modelling of academic behaviour in higher education
research and policy? A detailed exposition is not possible here, but I provide
a sketch of the epistemological and methodological concerns. The position I
endorse is decidedly negative.
The role of mathematical models in economics has generally been taken for
granted by economists since ‘formal’ approaches came to dominate the dis-
cipline in the early to mid-twentieth century. However, for methodologists
15 In economic modelling, the affect on research quality would be at the ‘intensive margin’
while the effect on the population of academics would be at the ‘extensive margin’.
16 The map analogy is often attributed to a story by Lewis Carroll.
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and philosophers the role and realism of models remains the subject of unre-
solved contention (Ma¨ki, 2002; Hands, 2013; Aydinonat, 2018).17 To simplify
matters, we may think of such models playing two roles: contributing to our
understanding, and serving as a basis for prescription. There is general agree-
ment that the latter, which is what JH seek to do with their policy proposals,
places much greater demands on any model. For instance, Pearl (2009) has
developed an entire theoretical framework (the ‘do calculus’) that formally
distinguishes variation created by an exogenous intervention from variation
that occurs within a system. And dissatisfaction with formal models has been
one of the main factors behind the rapid increase in experimental methods in
empirical work in economics (Angrist and Pischke, 2010).
An important criticism within the extant literature is that economic models
of behaviour necessitate the downplaying of unmeasurable and complex rela-
tionships in order to render the analysis tractable.18 In the present case, for
instance, the relationship between ‘institutional culture’ and intrinsic incen-
tives (parameters in the utility function) may be mentioned as a qualitative
aside (Jorgensenn and Hanssen, 2018: 1045) but is not modelled. So while JH
acknowledge the importance of intrinsic motivation and include it within the
representative academic’s utility function, it is not represented as manipulable
by policy and therefore cannot be reflected in the policy recommendations and
alternatives based on the model.
A popular example of the success of economic modelling may assist in making
the point. A number of authors have discussed the success of economic models
of auctions. Leaving aside the fact that applying such model is an art in itself
(Klemperer, 2004), auctions are quite unique environments. Among the key
characteristics of the auction case are: the question of interest is typically the
maximisation of financial returns; the notion that a market value is equiva-
lent to a notional objective value of the good is relatively uncontentious; the
motives of all economic agents can be assumed to largely reflect extrinsic (pe-
cuniary) factors; all key dimensions of the auction environment, within which
the model seeks to predict behaviour, are subject to the design of the policy-
maker themselves. In the case of higher education research, I would suggest
that these characteristics do not hold and, further to the question of the nature
of the university itself, it would be inherently undesirable for that to be the
case.
As a purely intellectual activity, there is nothing inherently wrong with using
formal models of individual behaviour to analyse academic incentives and out-
comes. However, there are numerous reasons to be deeply sceptical of claims
17 Economists themselves tend to limit contributions to this area to justifications for, or
rationalisations of, the status quo (Gilboa, Postlewaite, Samuelson, and Schmeidler, 2014;
Rodrik, 2015).
18 JH in fact discuss an aspect of this in relation to their transition from a general model
to one with very specific functional forms.
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that such models provide insight that cannot be provided by other methods,
that the insights so provided are more credible than other methods or in-
sights (including simple intuition), and that findings of such models can be
used as a foundation for policy interventions. As the preceding formal analysis
shows, the use of mathematical models can also (even if unwittingly) conceal
problematic assumptions from many readers and that in itself is a weakness.
These concerns apply to many other disciplines where such modelling is used.
Nevertheless, the paper by Jorgensenn and Hanssen (2018) is perhaps to be
welcomed in as much as it serves to draw attention in higher education research
to these important issues and serves as a basis for future debate.
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